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Abstract 
This article formulates a structural empirical model that measures the short run and long run 
effect of economic growth, political stability and corruption control on carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions from deforestation. Income has a negative effect on forest cover in the short run but it 
does not have any long run effect. In contrast, political stability and corruption have relatively 
smaller effects on forest cover in the short run but they have lingering long run effects. We 
derive a U-shaped forest-income curve where political stability and corruption control do not 
significantly affect the income turning point but both variables shift the curve up or down. The 
resulting CO2 emission-income curve is downward sloping and is based on changes in the levels 
of variables affecting forest cover. Increased political stability flattens the CO2 emissions-income 
curve leading to smaller changes of CO2 emissions per unit change in income. 
 
JEL classification: O10, Q23  
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Introduction 
In developing countries, the dominant contributor to greenhouse gas emissions is land 
conversion, in particular the conversion of forestland to agricultural, pasture or urban land use. 
Forests in developing countries, especially those that have significant tracts of tropical forest, 
retain large volumes of carbon dioxide (CO2), ranging from 100 to 250 metric tons per hectare 
(Crutzen and Andreae, 1990; Naughton-Treves, 2004). Land clearing, through slash-and-burn 
farming or shifting cultivation, leads to a release of stored CO2 into the atmosphere.  
  Studying the role of governance on economic growth and sustainable development has 
become a central focus in the literature (World Bank, 2002). Weak institutions due to corruption 
or political instability can hinder sustainable development. Corruption skews policies in favor of 
rent seeking firms (Bulte and Damania, 2008) and reduces public expenditure while political 
instability creates uncertainty that leads to less resource conservation (Deacon and Mueller, 
2004) and a reduction in resource stocks. Given the extent to which the rural economy is 
dependent on agriculture and forestland, the type of governance could have a significant effect 
on deforestation-induced CO2 emissions. 
  This article measures short run and long run effect of economic growth, political stability 
and corruption control on CO2 emissions from deforestation. We present a conceptual model that 
links how political stability and corruption control influence economic growth which, in turn, 
affects the direct factors of deforestation leading to releases or sequestration of CO2. We estimate 
a structural model to test how political stability and corruption control affect the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC) for deforestation-induced CO2 emissions. Our empirical analysis has 
important policy implications because it measures the immediate and long term effects of 
corruption control and political stability on CO2 emissions in developing countries.   2
  Unlike developing countries, the main source of CO2 emissions in developed countries is 
the industrial sector. Empirical findings to test for the existence of an EKC for CO2 in the 
national level show mixed results.  Various regression results have shown a monotonic (Shafik, 
1994), inverted U-shaped (Holtz-Eakin and Selden, 1995; Hill and Magnani, 2002) and N-
shaped (Sengupta, 1996) relationship between income and CO2 emissions. 
The mechanisms relating income to industrial CO2 emissions differ from the mechanisms 
relating income to deforestation-induced CO2 emissions. Deforestation depends on direct factors 
that immediately contribute to the conversion of forestland to other land uses, such as 
agricultural land expansion and road building, and underlying factors that influence the severity 
of the direct factors such as economic growth, political institutions and trade openness. The 
resulting CO2 emissions-income curve due to changes in forest cover may take a different form. 
Reduced-form estimation between per capita income and deforestation using cross-
country forest data from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have found the existence 
of an EKC relationship between income and forest cover with income turning points not too far 
from the current levels of per capita income of middle-income developing countries (Barbier and 
Burgess, 2001; Cropper and Griffiths, 1994). These studies have the advantage of deriving the 
net effect of income on forest cover but there are two important limitations. First, a reduced form 
estimation fails to control for the effect of omitted underlying factors. To the extent that these 
underlying factors are correlated with income, estimates of the effect of income on forest may be 
biased. Second, FAO forest data are derived through interpolations using a few years of actual 
data which may also bias the effect of income if income is used as a variable for interpolation.  
Microstudies use satellite imaging and GIS data to measure the effect of the direct factors 
on forest cover. An advantage of these types of studies is the strong quality of forest cover data   3
and direct factors data but it is difficult to analyze the effect of underlying factors on forest cover 
given the nature of the data. López and Galinato (2005a) overcome this problem by constructing 
a structural model that estimates the effect of underlying factors on the direct factors of 
deforestation, and combining them with estimates from microstudies. However, they did not 
consider the effects of political stability and corruption control.  
We define political stability as the ability of the government to implement its programs 
and stay in office. The quality of infrastructure is positively correlated with political stability of 
an economy (Gimenez and Sanau, 2007) and affects the creation and enforcement of laws. Thus, 
countries that are more politically stable are more likely to provide more enforcement of forest 
protection laws leading to a higher cost for land clearing and less conversion of forest land to 
agricultural land.  
Corruption control affects policy choice as well as availability of funds. Corruption 
increases the cost of infrastructure building (Kenny, 2006) which affects road building in the 
rural economy and can affect the set of technologies available for the farmer in the agricultural 
sector. Bridgman et al. (2007) and Bulte et al. (2007) show how lobbying groups have an 
incentive to block the adoption of superior technology in order to maximize rents thereby 
yielding inefficient modes of agricultural production. Thus, an increase in corruption control may 
increase available technology in the agricultural sector. Depending on the complementarity or 
substitutability of land and technology, corruption could lead to agricultural intensification or 
extensification which has a direct effect on forest cover.   
There are two studies to our knowledge that tried to integrate different measures of 
governance to understand the impact of income on forest cover. Lopez and Galinato (2005a) 
utilize a measure of polity which measures if a country is more democratic or dictatorial. They   4
find that a more democratic country will have a higher turning point than a less democratic 
country, but the forest-income curve may or may not shift depending on country characteristics. 
Bhattarai and Hammig (2004) use a reduced form specification to measure the effect of an 
overall index of governance capturing rule of law, bureaucratic quality and governmental 
corruption on deforestation rates. They find that improved governance fosters better management 
of forests resulting in a lower income turning point.  
Our study differs from the previos studies because we account for the effect of two 
different governance variables, political stability and corruption control, in a structural model 
instead of a reduced form formulation. Furthermore, we extend the empirical methodology of 
López and Galinato in two ways. First, we increase the number of countries in our sample by 
creating a unique dataset that isolates the amount of agricultural land encroaching on forestland. 
Second, we measure the short-run and long-run effect of income and governance on forestland 
and CO2 emissions. This is the first study we are aware of that compares the immediate and long 
term effects of governance and income on deforestation-related CO2 emissions. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the conceptual model. 
Section 2 formulates the empirical model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the 
results of the regressions and simulations of CO2 emissions from deforestation. Section 5 
concludes the study. 
1.  Conceptual model 
Figure 1 depicts the conceptual foundation linking governance variables and economic growth to 
deforestation-induced CO2 emissions. We outline three blocks of causation and use different 
approaches to integrate each aspect into our empirical estimation.    5
In Block I, we use a new dataset to empirically estimate the effect of economic growth 
and governance on the direct factors of deforestation. The direct factors of deforestation 
immediately contribute to the conversion of forest land to other land uses. We focus on two key 
direct factors: agricultural land expansion and road building. There may be a bi-causal 
relationship between agricultural land clearing and road building because road construction into 
forest regions induces land clearing for agricultural purposes and agricultural expansion leads to 
increased lobbying to develop rural infrastructure.
1 The decision to expand land for agricultural 
purposes or the decision to build roads is dependent on underlying factors such as economic 
growth (Koop and Tole, 1999), political institutions (Nguyen Van and Azomahou, 2007) and 
trade openness (López and Galinato, 2005b).  
Galinato and Galinato (2010) develop a theoretical model relating two measures of 
governance, political stability and corruption control, on the choice of farmers to expand 
agricultural land and the choice of the local government to build rural infrastructure. They show 
that increased corruption control could lead to agricultural extensification (intensification) and 
less (more) rural road building when land and technology are complements (substitutes) and 
when the effect of corruption control on the cost of infrastructure is low (high). Political stability 
also has an ambiguous effect on agricultural land clearing and rural road building because more 
political stability only assures policy continuation. If environmental policies are stringent, more 
political stability implies higher cost of land clearing but the opposite holds if environmental 
policies are lax.  
Economic growth directly increases agricultural land expansion but has an ambiguous 
effect on rural road infrastructure. For example, unpaved roads may decrease as the economy 
                                                 
1 Logging has its own dynamics partly independent of road construction. However, initial logging is usually 
followed by agricultural expansion making it difficult to separate the effect of logging from agricultural expansion.   6
grows because they are considered inferior goods while paved road construction may increase 
because they are normal goods.  
In Block II, we use existing studies in the literature that estimate the effect of agricultural 
land expansion and road building on forest cover. A number of recent microstudies that analyze 
the determinants of deforestation relied on data from satellite images, local surveys and remote 
sensing (Panayotou and Sungsuwan, 1994; Chomitz and Thomas, 2003; Cropper et al., 2001; 
López, 1997 and 2000). There is a consistent negative effect of expansion of agricultural land 
and road building on forest cover. 
In Block III, we simulate the effect of a change in forest cover on CO2 emissions.  Any 
reduction in forest cover leads to a release of CO2. We combine our estimates from Blocks I and 
II with the simulated estimates in Block III to arrive at the total effect of underlying factors such 
as economic growth and governance on deforestation-induced CO2 emissions. 
2. Empirical  model 
Using our conceptual framework, we start by postulating the impact of the direct factors on 
forest cover from Block II, 
(1) Fab Rc Z d     X , 
where F is the log of forest area, R is the log of the length of road networks the rural sector, Z is 
the log forest land cleared for agricultural purposes, X is a vector of other direct factors and  is 
a random disturbance term. The coefficients b and c are the elasticities of road networks and 
agricultural land area on forest cover, respectively. We do not estimate equation (1), instead we 
use estimates from microstudies to derive parameters for b and c. 
  From Block I of the conceptual framework, we formulate and estimate equations that 
explain the effect of underlying factors on R and Z,   7
(2) 
2
01 , 12 3 4 5 6 7 it i t it it it it it it it it i t it RZ Y Y Y C Y S C S                     A ;        
(3)
2
01 , 12 3 4 5 6 7 it i t it it it it it it it it i t it ZR Y Y Y C Y S C S                    B ; 
where subscript i and t represents country and time, respectively and j and j (j=0,..,7) are 
parameters. Thus, Yit is log of gross domestic product per capita; Cit is a measure of log 
corruption control; Sit is a measure of log political stability; i and i are country effects which 
can be fixed or random, t and y are time effects common to all countries; and it and it are 
random disturbance. A and B are vectors of variables associated with the vector of parameters B 
and , respectively.   
  We categorize five factors affecting roads and agricultural land clearing: (1) income per 
capita; (2) measures of governance captured by political stability and corruption control; (3) 
macroeconomic policies; (4) unmeasured country-specific factors and (5) global economic 
conditions affecting all countries in a given time period. Because we are interested in examining 
if there exists a reasonable turning point on income per capita in relation to deforestation-induced 
CO2 emissions, we specify income per capita squared in our model. Political stability and 
corruption control are our measures of governance and they affect our CO2-income relationship 
by influencing the potential turning point and the pollution level.  
  The expansion of agricultural crop production into forested areas may not immediately 
induce an increase in the rural road network and rural road building may not immediately lead to 
agricultural land expansion. For this reason, agricultural expansion is lagged in equation (2) and 
road networks are lagged in equation (3).  
  Macroeconomic policies include trade policies, foreign direct investment and other 
country characteristics that change over time. Unmeasured country-specific factors are structural 
characteristics that change little, if at all, throughout time, such as climate, geographical   8
conditions, and factor endowments. We use fixed or random effects to capture these variables. 
Lastly, global economic conditions are international shocks that are likely to affect all countries 
at the same time. We use time dummies to capture this effect. 
The effect of income and governance on forest cover 









The short-run effect of income on roads and agricultural land clearing are,
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Using (5) and (6) into (4), we derive the total short-run effect of income per capita on forest 
cover. In the long run, the effect of any variable at time t is the same as time t-1. By 
simultaneously solving for (2) and (3), we obtain the long-run equation linking income to the 
direct factors of deforestation, 
(7) 
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Using (7) and (8) into (4), we derive the long-run effect of income on forest cover.  
We hypothesize that the forest-income curve is a U-shaped relationship where initial 
increases in income result in a decrease in forest cover. It may reach a turning point, or per capita 
income level at which the slope of the forest-income relationship is zero, where any income level 
beyond it will yield an increase in forest cover. Even if a turning point does exist, it may not fall 
                                                 
2 We drop the subscripts to minimize notation clutter.   9
within the credible ranges of per capita income for a particular country. A U-shaped relationship 
forest-income curve exists if the derivative of (4) with respect to income is positive.  
The short-run turning point is derived by substituting (5) and (6) into (4) and equating (4) 
to zero to solve for Y. A similar procedure is conducted to derive the long-run turning points but 
now (7) and (8) are substituted into (4). The short-run, Y
t
sr, and long-run turning points, Y
t
lr, are 
expressed as,  
(9) 
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The main difference in the short run and long run is the potential for road building and 
agricultural land clearing to affect each other in the latter but not in the former. If road networks 
and agricultural land demand are complements, the long run turning point is likely to be larger 
than the short run turning point, all other variables constant. However, if income reduces road 
infrastructure in the rural areas because of rural-urban migration or has a negative effect on 
agricultural land demand then it is difficult a priori to compare the short-run versus the long-run 
effects of income on forest cover. 
Corruption control and political stability may affect the steepness of the forest-income 
curve as well as the turning point. If the current level of income is on the downward sloping 
portion of the forest-income curve, faster economic growth would mean faster deforestation with 
a steep forest-income curve. The effect of corruption control and political stability on the turning 
point will depend on the effect of both variables on income. If improvements in both governance 
variables induce economic growth, the turning point may be lower.   10
  Corruption control and political stability may also have a direct effect on the level of 
forest cover. The level effects in the short run are derived by taking the derivative of (1) with 
respect to C and S, 


















The long-run level effects are derived by simultaneously solving for (2) and (3) when t = t-1, 
 (13)
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(14) 
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. 
It is not clear a priori if the short-run effect is larger or smaller than the long-run effect since it 
will depend on the relationship between road building and agricultural land clearing as well as 
the indirect effects of the governance variables through income.  
The effect of corruption control and political stability on carbon dioxide emissions 
Total carbon dioxide emissions, E, is dependent on the change in forest cover and can be 
specified as, 
(15) EF    , 
where  is a conversion coefficient that estimates the amount of carbon dioxide sequestered or 
emitted from a change in forest area.  
  Naughton-Treves (2004) uses the following conversion coefficient formula, 
(16)   = B  F  E, 
where B is aboveground live biomass of forest megagrams per hectare (Mg/ha); F is the CO2 
fraction of dry biomass; and E is the burning efficiency of forest clearance, which refers to the   11
percentage of heat content in the wood that can be extracted and used. Naughton-Treves (2004) 
uses different parameters for primary and secondary forests. For mature forests she uses values 
of 0.5 for F and 407 Mg/ha for B. The estimated value of E is 0.4 if reburning of primary forests 
occurs (Crutzen and Andreae, 1990). Estimated burning efficiency for fallow or secondary 
forests is at 0.6 but the CO2 fraction of dry biomass remains the same. The biomass from fallow 
forest is equal to the average accumulation of aboveground biomass multiplied by the fallow 
period. Naughton-Treves (2004) assumes that biomass fallow is 11.5 Mg C/(ha year) and the 
average fallow period is 3.2 years.  
The total change in forest cover depends on the summation of changes for each 
significant variable multiplied by the variable’s partial effect on forest cover, 








  , 
where xi is the i
th significant variable affecting forest cover. The amount of CO2 flow attributed 
to changes in income, EY, only is 









Using (4), (5) and (6) into (18), we can derive the short-run CO2 emissions due to changes in 
income, EY
SR; and using (4), (7) and (8) into (18) we derive the long-run emissions, EY
LR,  
(19)    234 5 2345 (2 ) (2 )
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(20) 
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. 
There are three important items to note linking the effect of income on deforestation- 
induced CO2 emissions. First, the level effects of income may have an impact on forest cover but 
not CO2 emissions. If there are no changes in income level, there will be no changes in forest   12
level, all else constant; therefore there will be no CO2 emissions. Only a change income can 
induce CO2 emissions. Second, given a change in income, the carbon emissions level may also 
be affected by corruption control and political stability levels. Lastly, it is difficult to compare 
the short-run effect to the long-run effect of income given the interaction of road building and 
agricultural land clearing as well as economic growth, political stability and corruption control. 
Hypotheses 
From our empirical model, the following hypotheses are formulated and tested: 
1.  Countries with more political stability and less corruption will have higher forest levels in 
the short run and long run. This implies testing if equations (11) to (14) are positive.  
2.  The forest-income relationship is U-shaped in the long run and short run. This implies 
that at low income levels, an increase in income leads to a decrease in forest cover. 
However, after reaching a turning point, further increases in income lead to an increase in 











3.  The turning point is lower in more politically stable and less corrupt countries in the long 
run and short run. To test this hypothesis, we examine if the partial derivatives of (9) and 
(10) with respect to corruption control and political stability are negative. 
3. Data description  
The set of countries in our sample were selected based on the methodology of López et al. (2002) 
where developing countries with significant absolute and relative forest cover are identified. 
Furthermore, we focused only on countries where there is a prevalence of agricultural crop 
encroachment on forest land. There is consistent evidence of tropical deforestation in Latin 
America due to agriculture and pasture conversion practices (Houghton et al., 1991) while   13
shifting cultivation is widespread in Asia, especially in Southeast Asian countries (Rerkasem et 
al., 2009).
3  Thus, we have twenty-two countries in our sample all from Latin America and Asia. 
Appendix 1 lists these countries and identifies crops that encroach on forest land. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics from our sample, covering the periods 1990 to 
2003.  The key variables in our study are agricultural cropland and roads encroaching on forest 
cover and two governance indices: political stability and corruption control. We calculated our 
own measure of cropland expansion by identifying crops encroaching on forested areas for each 
country in our sample. Crops are selected based on available reports and studies regarding the 
country’s food/cash crops and forest resources.  We add the total amount of harvested land area 
for each crop using data from FAOSTAT in each country. By creating this variable instead of 
using aggregate cropland area, we are able to avoid overestimating the effect of governance on 
cropland area encroaching on forest regions. We used unpaved road length in kilometers from 
the World Development Indicators because it is a common type of rural infrastructure that 
connects agricultural and forest land and precedes any paved road construction.   
We obtained data from the International Country Risk Guide for the political stability and 
corruption control indices.  Political stability assesses the government’s ability to implement its 
programs and to stay in office and is composed of government unity, legislative strength and 
popular support. Scores range from 0 to 12 where a score of zero equates to low political 
stability. The corruption control index measures corruption within the political system. It 
captures financial corruption such as bribes for police protection, tax assessments, export/import 
licenses or loans; and insidious forms of corruption such as nepotism, job reservations, favor-for-
favors and secret party funding. The score of the corruption index ranges between 0 and 6, where 
                                                 
3 African countries were excluded in the study because deforestation is mainly driven by the collection and 
consumption of fuelwood (Ribot, 1999).  Developing countries in Europe and developed countries were likewise 
excluded since the major cause of deforestation is land clearing for urban developments (EEA, 2006).   14
zero means low corruption control. Appendix 2 presents the definitions and data sources of all 
variables in the study.    
4. Results 
We present the regressions showing the effect of governance on cropland expansion and unpaved 
road development into forest areas. Next, we combine the estimates of our regressions with 
coefficients from studies that measure the effect of direct factors on forest cover. Lastly, we 
simulate the CO2 emissions given changes in forest cover. 
Underlying factors and direct factors of deforestation 
Table 2 summarizes the effects of the underlying factors on two direct factors of deforestation: 
road building and agricultural crop expansion. The role of per capita income is highly significant 
on agricultural land clearing. Per capita income increases agricultural land clearing at a 
decreasing rate. On the other hand, per capita income has a consistent negative impact on 
unpaved road construction, albeit not as significant as agricultural land clearing. The negative 
effect indicates that unpaved road construction is an inferior infrastructure commodity.  
  Political stability has a negative and significant effect on agricultural land clearing which 
is consistent with our discussion where political stability may lead to more programs that protect 
natural resources thereby increasing the cost of agricultural land clearing. Political stability has a 
positive effect on road building which is also consistent with the idea that more stable 
governments can establish more public projects. Corruption control does not seem to have any 
direct significant effect on either of our direct factors of deforestation. However, a joint test on 
our corruption control variable and corruption control and income per capita interaction variable 
shows that they are jointly positive and significant in affecting agricultural land clearing. If land   15
and technology are complements, more corruption control could increase technological 
development and lead to agricultural extensification.   
The total effect of underlying factors on forest cover 
We integrate our regression estimates with parameter estimates from microstudies that use 
individual country survey statistics, remote sensing or GIS data to analyze the effect of direct 
factors on deforestation. There are only a few microstudies that have derived the long-run and 
short-run effects of forest-competing crop area and roads. We have chosen from this set those 
parameters that are most compatible with our estimates based on methodological estimation and 
availability of descriptive statistics. In order to create elasticities comparable with our estimates, 
we use the implied marginal effects from the studies we selected and calculate the elasticities of 
the direct factors on forest cover using average forest cover, average unpaved road levels and 
average crop area in our sample.  
  The short-run and long-run effects of crop area on forest cover were taken from two 
studies. To derive the short run elasticity, we use estimates from López (2000) who found that a 
one hectare increase in area cultivated results in 4.4 hectares (has) decrease in forest cover in 
rural villages in Western Ivory Coast. This marginal effect is larger than one because conversion 
of forest cover to agricultural land also requires additional clearing for human settlement, 
infrastructure and other related activities supporting agricultural production. We use estimates 
from Maertens et al. (2006) to derive the long-run effect of shifting cultivation on forest cover. 
They find that a one hectare increase in area of shifting cultivation in Indonesia from 1980 to 
2001 yielded a decrease in forest cover by 0.88 has. The implied marginal effect is less than one 
in the long run possibly because abandoning the area could have led to re-growth of natural 
forest vegetation.    16
  Panayotou and Sungsuwan (1994) measure the effect of road networks on forest cover in 
Thailand. They find that a one kilometer (km) increase in road networks decreases forest cover 
by 0.27 km
2. Unfortunately, we were not able to find any studies that estimated the long-run 
effects of road networks on forest cover, so we assume that the short-run and long-run effects of 
road building are the same in our calculation. 
  Table 3 summarizes the total effects of income per capita and our two measures of 
governance on forest cover are evaluated at the mean levels. The elasticity of income on forest 
cover is derived using equations (4), (5) and (6) in the short run and (4), (7) and (8) in the long 
run. The total short-run effect of income per capita on forest cover is negative and significant. 
Income per capita decreases forest cover through increased agricultural crop expansion but it has 
a tendency to increase forest cover by reducing unpaved road construction where the former 
effect outweighs the latter effect. We do not find any persistent effect of GDP on forest cover in 
the long run. 
  The average economic growth in Latin America over our sample countries is 1.61% 
while it is 3.27% in Asia. This growth would lead to a decrease in forest cover of about 0.06% 
and 0.13% in Latin America and Asia, respectively, in the short run. The actual rates of 
deforestation in Latin America and Asia are higher at 0.6% and 0.7%, respectively. Thus, income 
growth explains less than a quarter of deforestation. The combined impact of other policies such 
as governance, trade and foreign direct investment may explain other sources of deforestation.  
  The short-run and long-run effects of corruption control on forest cover are derived using 
equations (11) and (13), respectively. The impact of corruption control on forest cover is 
negative and significant in the short run and the long run. Although corruption control has an 
insignificant effect on road building, it has a significant negative effect on forest cover because it   17
induces an increase in agricultural land clearing.  One explanation is that more corruption control 
could induce technological innovation and, if technology and land are complements in 
production, could lead to more land clearing for agricultural purposes. In contrast, political 
stability increases forest cover in the short run and long run. There is a significant positive effect 
of political stability because it induces a reduction in agricultural land clearing. Interestingly, 
there is a significant lingering effect in the long run in both of our measures of governance on 
forest cover but the magnitude is smaller. This result highlights the potential structural impacts 
of governance on natural capital. Our results partially verify Hypothesis 1. We do find that more 
politically stable countries have higher levels of forest cover but countries with higher levels of 
corruption control have lower forest cover, all else constant. 
In order to derive a clear picture of the effect of our governance variables on forest cover, 
we simulate the effect of corruption control and political stability for Brazil and Indonesia, the 
countries with the most tropical forest cover. If the corruption control level of Brazil and 
Indonesia improved to the same stringency as Costa Rica, the country with the highest measure 
of corruption control in our sample, we estimate a 0.7% and 2.2% decrease in forest cover from 
agricultural land expansion in the short run, respectively. If Brazil and Indonesia improved 
political stability to similar levels in China, the most politically stable country in our sample, we 
estimate an increase in forest cover by 0.3% and 0.2%, respectively, in the short run.  
Turning Point in the Forest Income Curve 
The income turning point we derive in the short run is approximately $2600, a value 
significantly lower than those calculated in other studies such as Cropper and Griffiths (1994).  
The average per capita income from our sample of countries is approximately $1500 which is 
lower than our estimated turning point. The long-run turning point is significantly lower than the   18
short run turning point at $1200 as illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The take away point is 
not the magnitude themselves but the potential for lowering the turning point in the long run 
given the interaction of agricultural land clearing and unpaved road construction. However, 
caution must be taken in interpreting this result. If paved road construction substitutes for 
unpaved road construction, our long-run turning point value may even be higher than the short-
run turning point level.  
  Table 4 summarizes the tests on the forest and CO2 Environmental Kuznets Curves. 
Hypothesis 2, which tests if a U-shaped forest-income curve exists, is verified since we show 
that 
2F/Y
2, or the effect of income on additional forest cover from income, is positive and 
significant. The effect is more significant and positive in the short run than the long run which 
implies that there is a larger turning point confidence interval in the long run.  
  Hypothesis 3 regarding a lower turning point for politically stable and less corrupt 
countries is not statistically verified. We find a weak significant but positive effect of political 
stability on the turning point in the short run. Economic growth may complement the effect of 
political stability by increasing agricultural land expansion leading to a higher turning point.  
  The results from our hypothesis tests imply that we can derive forest-income curves in 
the short run and long run as illustrated in the top panel of Figures 2 and 3. In the short run, when 
there is more corruption control, the forest-income curve shifts down but the turning point does 
not change. As we move to the long run, the turning point is now lower and more corruption 
control still leads to a lower forest-income curve.  
  The effect of political stability on the forest-income curve is more complicated. In the 
short run, as countries become more politically stable, the forest-income curve shifts up and to 
the right, signifying an increase in forest cover, and a higher income turning point. In the long   19
run, the turning point is lower and the forest-income curve shifts up as countries are more 
politically stable.  
Carbon dioxide emissions and governance 
Deforestation-induced CO2 emissions are fundamentally different than industrial-related carbon 
dioxide emissions. In the latter, there are CO2 emissions for a given level of income per capita, 
corruption control or government stability; however, in the former, emissions only occur if there 
are changes in these variables as shown in equation (17). Thus, for income per capita to have any 
effect on deforestation-induced CO2 emissions, the country would need to be growing or 
contracting over time. If we have a U-shaped forest-income curve, the corresponding CO2 
emissions-income curve would be downward sloping and crosses the income-axis at the turning 
point. Any point to the left of the turning point implies that there are CO2 emissions and to the 
right of the turning point, CO2 is sequestered because of an increase in forest cover.  
  If a governance variable decreases the slope of the forest income curve, then CO2 
emissions are less responsive to income changes. We find that corruption control does not have 
any significant effect on the slope of the forest income curve in the short run or long run. Thus, 
the effect of corruption control on the CO2 emissions-income curve is illustrated as such in the 
bottom panel of Figure 2.  
  Political stability has a more complicated effect. More political stability decreases the 
marginal effect of income on forest cover in the short run leading to a flatter slope of the forest-
income curve. This implies that the CO2 emissions levels will be lower for countries with more 
political stability given the same level of income. Also, since the turning point increases with 
more political stability, the CO2 emissions-income curve shifts to the right. In the long run, the 
same curve shifts to the left because of a decrease in the income turning point.   20
  We simulate the effect of carbon dioxide emissions caused by deforestation in the 1990s 
using equation (18) and summarize the results in Table 5. Across all countries in our sample, 
carbon dioxide emissions from deforestation explain about 4.7% of total carbon dioxide 
emissions. We break down the sample into two: countries that have more than 30 million has of 
primary forest and those that have less than 30 million has. Countries that have at least 30 
million has of primary forest release about 33% of their CO2 emissions from deforestation. Thus, 
forest clearing explains a significant share of total CO2 emissions in countries that have large 
remaining primary forests. For countries that have less than 30 million has of primary forest, we 
find a net uptake instead of a release in CO2. Among the countries in this subset, China has seen 
a decrease in primary forest cover but it has been compensated by a significant increase in 
secondary forest from 1990 to 2000 leading to a net CO2 uptake. If we leave China out of the 
sample, we find a decrease of 1000 has of forest cover which implies that deforestation accounts 
for 2% of total CO2 emissions for the remaining countries in the sample.  
  Economic growth explains 23% or approximately 3.3 million Mg per annum of 
deforestation-induced CO2 emissions. For countries that have more than 30 million has of 
primary forest and those that have less than 30 million has, economic growth explains 13% and 
28% of deforestation-induced CO2 emissions, respectively. This implies that the net effect of all 
non-growth factors is to exacerbate deforestation and corresponding CO2 emissions. 
  The average corruption control levels have decreased for countries in our sample. The 
largest decreases came from countries with more than 30 million has of primary forest. We find 
CO2 uptake because decreased corruption control has a positive effect on forest cover. 
Corruption control accounts for 0.1% of deforestation-induced CO2 emissions.   21
  Political stability has increased for countries in our sample. More stable government 
leads to more forest cover and, therefore, CO2 uptake. There is a larger amount of variation 
explained by political stability compared to corruption control because it accounts for 7% of 
deforestation-induced CO2 emissions. 
5. Conclusion 
The main objective of this article is to determine the effect of income per capita, political 
stability and corruption control on the forest-income relationship and the corresponding CO2 
emissions-income curve using a structural empirical model. Income per capita has a negative and 
significant impact on forest cover in the short run but does not have any lingering effects in the 
long run. In contrast, we do find that more politically stable countries have higher levels of forest 
cover but countries with higher levels of corruption control do not have higher forest cover. The 
effects of both governance variables are persistent since their effects continue in the long run 
albeit at a smaller magnitude. 
  A U-shaped forest-income curve exists. Political stability and corruption control do not 
lower the turning point. The resulting deforestation-induced CO2 emission-income curve is 
downward sloping and is based on changes in income per capita affecting forest cover. More 
political stability flattens the CO2 emissions-income curve in the short run leading to less 
responsive CO2 emissions given changes in income.  
One limitation of our current model is that we focus only on two direct causes of 
deforestation: cropland expansion and road building. We do not include other potential channels 
of deforestation such as logging and rural poverty. A future study may want to examine the total 
effects of including other potential channels and verify how the income and governance effects 
may differ through these channels. If the effect of income and the governance variables on other   22
direct factors are in the same direction as cropland expansion and road building, we are likely to 
see a more pronounced U-shaped forest-income curve with a higher turning point. On the other 
hand, the net effects may be more difficult to hypothesize if there are countervailing effects 
across different direct channels.   
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Tables 
Table 1. Summary statistics of variables 
Variable Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
   
Crop, area harvested (ha)  761,937.64 10.28 2,000.00 39,624,968.69 
GDP per capita ($)  1,477.85 2.29 270.40 5,934.99 
Crop price index  1.10 5.81 0.02 9,207.08 
Foreign direct investment  2.64 2.37 -2.76 12.88 
Political stability index  7.53 2.01 3.00 11.00 
Corruption control index  2.91 0.92 1.00 5.00 
Trade openness  0.85 33.42 -57.64 162.67 
Unpaved road (km)  56,261.18 4.98 861.05 1,795,851.79 
Investment price  54.23 1.39 15.36 105.14   27
Table 2. Determinants of cropland area and unpaved roads in developing countries 
Dependent variable Log of cropland area  Log of unpaved roads 
Variables OLS  TWFE   RE  HTRE  OLS  TWFE RE HTRE
Lag of log crop land  0.546*** 0.688 0.566*** 0.646***
   (0.033)  (0.492) (0.119)  (0.107) 
Lag of log unpaved roads  1.138*** 0.115*** 0.155*** 0.121***       
 (0.069) (0.025) (0.033) (0.032)       
Log of GDP per capita   20.403*** 3.594*** 3.509*** 3.582***  -17.156*** -0.848 -3.008*  -1.436 
 (1.883) (0.995) (1.148) (1.059)  (1.141)  (4.842) (2.086)  (2.102) 
Log of GDP per capita squared  -1.410*** -0.220*** -0.210*** -0.218*** 1.187*** -0.062 0.130  -0.009 
 (0.149) (0.075) (0.081) (0.073)  (0.085)  (0.288) (0.140)  (0.144) 
Log of investment price index    0.557*  0.047 0.041  0.039 
   (0.376)  (0.144) (0.104)  (0.135) 
Log of crop price index  0.116*** 0.005 0.005 0.005       
 (0.025) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)       
Foreign direct investment over GDP  -0.159*** -0.009 -0.009 * -0.009**  0.025  0.026 *** 0.028*** 0.026***
 (0.052) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.029)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) 
Corruption control  -3.048*** 0.104 0.109 0.106  1.029*** -0.253 -0.288  -0.263 
 (0.988) (0.239) (0.180) (0.142)  (0.478)  (0.356) (0.261)  (0.285) 
Log of GDP per capita x Corruption 
control 0.279*** -0.005 -0.007 -0.006  -0.080  0.033 0.039  0.035 
 (0.134) (0.032) (0.024) (0.020)  (0.065)  (0.047) (0.036)  (0.040) 
Political stability  -0.309 -0.075 ** -0.074 * -0.075** 0.704*** 0.022 0.106*  0.044 
 (0.373) (0.043) (0.051) (0.043)  (0.218)  (0.101) (0.071)  (0.091) 
Log of GDP per capita x Political 
stability 0.074 0.008 0.008 0.008  -0.104*** -0.001 -0.014  -0.005 
 (0.052) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)  (0.031)  (0.012) (0.010)    (0.012) 
Index of trade openness  0.021*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.011*** -0.0001 -0.001  -0.0004 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) 
Constant -71.523*** -1.908 -2.028 -2.363  61.545*** 10.800 17.853*** 11.976* 
    (6.568) (3.395) (4.082) (3.981)  (3.602) (16.606) (7.100) (7.569) 
R-squared  0.741 0.175 0.221    0.733  0.350 0.428   
Number  of  observations  227 227 227 251  251  251 251 251 
Annual  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Hausman test (prob Chi-squared)      (-)        0.46   
Notes: Robust standard errors.  
*** 5%, **10%, *15% levels of significance   28
Table 3. Total effect of GDP and governance on forest cover 
 Crop  channel Road  channel Total  effect 






GDP  -0.061  0.074 0.022**  0.017 -0.040*  0.033 
Corruption 
Control 
-0.017***  0.009 -0.0003  0.001 -0.017***  0.009 
Political 
Stability 
0.004** 0.002  0.00001 0.0003  0.004** 0.003 
Long  run        
GDP  -0.007  0.015 0.020*  0.016 0.013 0.025 
Corruption 
Control 
-0.004***  0.002 -0.001  0.001 -0.005**  0.003 
Political 
Stability 
0.001**  0.0005 0.0002 0.0004 0.001**  0.0008 
Note: *** 5%, ** 10%, *15% levels of significance 
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Table 4. Tests on forest–income curve and CO2 emissions–income curve properties 
Forest–income curve properties  Short run  Long run 
Effect of income on marginal forest cover 













CO2 emissions–income curve properties     
Effect of corruption control on marginal 





Effect of political stability on marginal 





Note: *** 5%, ** 10%, *15% levels of significance   30
Table 5. Estimated annual CO2 emissions due to growth in GDP, corruption control and 
government stability 
 Countries  with 
more than 30 
million ha of 
primary forest 
Countries with 
less than 30 





Estimated Annual Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
From the Industrial Sector in 1000 Mg 
117,521 357,031  292,162 
Estimated Annual Carbon Dioxide Release From 








Effect of economic growth       
Average Annual Growth of GDP Per Capita (%)  2.0  2.4  2.3 
Estimated Annual Carbon Dioxide Release From 
Forest Clearing in 1000 Mg (as percent of total 







Effect of corruption control       
Average Annual percentage change in corruption 
control (%) 
-1.0 -0.1  -0.4 
Estimated Annual Carbon Dioxide Release From 
Forest Clearing in 1000 Mg (as percent of total 







Effect of government stability       
Average Annual percentage change in 
government stability (%) 
3.7 7.9  6.7 
Estimated Annual Carbon Dioxide Release From 
Forest Clearing in 1000 Mg (as percent of total 











































Figure 1. Linking deforestation-related carbon dioxide 
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Figure 2. Effect of corruption control on forest cover-income curve and CO2 
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Figure 3. Effect of political stability on forest-income curve and CO2 emissions-income 
curve in the short run (SR) and long run (LR).   34
 
APPENDIX 1 
LIST OF COUNTRIES AND AGRICULTURAL CROPS ENCROACHING ON FOREST LAND 
Country  Crop/s  Source/s 
Bangladesh  Oilseeds, rubber, cotton  Golam Rasul. 2007. “Political Ecology of Degradation of Forest Common in 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh.” Environmental Conservation 34 
(2): 153–163. 
Bolivia  Quinoa, fava bean, maize, maize green, 
potato, barley, soybeans 
Bluffstone, R., M. Boscolo and R. Molina. 2002. “How does community 
forestry affect rural households: A labor allocation model of the Bolivian 
Andes.”  See Table 6. Available from: 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/985 
 
World Rainforest Movement. 2004. “The Focus of this Issue: The Role of 
Agriculture and Cattle Raising in Deforestation.” Issue Number 85. Available 
from: http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/85/viewpoint.html. 
Brazil  Banana, coffee, maize, rice, soybeans, 
cassava/tapioca, beans (including cowpeas 
and other types) 
López, R. and G. I. Galinato. 2005. “Trade Policies, Economic Growth, and 
the Direct Causes of Deforestation.” Land Economics 81 (2): 145-169. 
 
Simon, M.F. and F.L. Garagorry. 2005. "The expansion of agriculture in the 
Brazilian Amazon." Environmental Conservation 32 (3): 203–212. 
China  Soybeans  World Rainforest Movement. 2004. “The Focus of this Issue: The Role of 
Agriculture and  Cattle Raising in Deforestation.” Issue Number 85. 
Available from: http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/85/viewpoint.html. 
Colombia  Banana, arrowleaf, new cocoyam, maize, 
pineapple, sugar cane, cassava/manioc 
Eden, M.J. and A. Andrade. 1988. "Colonos, Agriculture and Adaptation in 
the Colombian Amazon." Journal of Biogeography 15(1): 79-85. 
Costa Rica  Banana, mango  Christian, S. 1992. "There's a Bonanza in Nature for Costa Rica, but Its 
Forests Too Are Besieged."  The New York Times.  Available from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/29/world/there-s-a-bonanza-in-nature-for-
costa-rica-but-its-forests-too-are-besieged.html. 
Dominican Republic  Coffee, corn  Rosa, H. 2004. “Economic Integration and the Environment in El Salvador.” 
Working Group on Development and Environment in the Americas, 
Discussion Paper No. 7. Available from: 
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/pubs/rp/DP07RosaJuly04.pdf. 
Ecuador  Cacao, coffee, manioc/cassava, naranjilla, 
tea, palm oil, rice, maize 
Schaller et al.  no date.  “Indigenous Ecotourism and Sustainable 
Development: The Case of Río Blanco, Ecuador.” 
http://www.eduweb.com/schaller/Section1RioBlanco1.html   35
Country  Crop/s  Source/s 
Honduras  Beans, coffee, maize  Tucker, C.M., D.K. Munroe, H. Nagendra and J. Southworth. 2005. 
“Comparative Spatial Analyses of Forest Conservation and Change in 
Honduras and Guatemala.” Conservation and Society 3(1): 174 - 200. 
India  Soybeans  World Rainforest Movement. 2004. “The Focus of this Issue: The Role of 
Agriculture and  Cattle Raising in Deforestation.” Issue Number 85. 
Available from: http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/85/viewpoint.html. 
Indonesia  Coconut, rubber, palm oil  López, R. and G. I. Galinato. 2005. “Trade Policies, Economic Growth, and 
the Direct Causes of Deforestation.” Land Economics 81(2): 145-169. 
 
World Rainforest Movement. 2004. “The Focus of this Issue: The Role of 
Agriculture and  Cattle Raising in Deforestation.” Issue Number 85. 
Available from: http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/85/viewpoint.html. 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  Wheat  Subregional report of the Forestry Outlook Study for West and Central Asia. 
Available from: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/k1652e/k1652e03.pdf. 
Malaysia  Coconut, rubber, palm oil, rice  López, R. and G. I. Galinato. 2005. “Trade Policies, Economic Growth, and 
the Direct Causes of Deforestation.” Land Economics 81(2): 145-169. 
 
World Rainforest Movement. 2004. “The Focus of this Issue: The Role of 
Agriculture and  Cattle Raising in Deforestation.” Issue Number 85. 
Available from: http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/85/viewpoint.html. 
Mexico  Maize, commercial chili  Deininger, K.W. and B. Minten. 1999. “Poverty, policies, and deforestation: 
The case of Mexico.” World Bank Research Paper. Available from: 
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?EDCCv47p313PS. 
 
Turner, B. L., II, P.A. Matson, J.J. McCarthy, R.W. Corell, L.Christensen, N. 
Eckley, G. Hovelsrud-Broda, J.X. Kasperson, R.E. Kasperson, A. Luers, M.L. 
Martello, S. Mathiesen, R. Naylor, C. Polsky, A. Pulsipher, A. Schiller, H. 
Selin, and N. Tyler. 2003. “Illustrating the Coupled Human-Environment 
System for Vulnerability Analysis: Three Case Studies.” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 100(14): 
8080-8085. Available from: 
http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/sust.nsf/pubs/pub83. 
Nicaragua  Palm fruit  From Meals to Wheels: The Social and Ecological Catastrophe of Biofuels. 
Available from: http://www.globaljusticeecology.org/files/GJEP-biofuels-
comp.pdf.   36
Country  Crop/s  Source/s 
Pakistan  Sugar cane  Abbas, M. , S.H. Khan, R.A. Khan and M. Shahbaz. 2004. “Impact of Wild 
Boar Habitat on Sugarcane Crop.” International Journal of Agriculture and 
Biology  6(2): 420-421. 
Panama  Coffee  Beatty, A. 2008. Gourmet Coffee Eats into Panama Forest. Reuters Article. 
Available from: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSN2233936820080723. 
Peru  Cassava/tapioca, peach palm, maize, 
plantains, rice 
Staver, C., R. Simeone and A. Stocks. 1994. “Land Resource Management 
and Forest Conservation in Central Amazonian Peru: Regional, Community, 
and Farm-Level Approaches among Native Peoples.” Mountain Research and 
Development 14(2): 147-157. 
Philippines  Cassava, corn, rice, sweet potato  Honda, Y. 1997. “Philippine Sugar and Environment.” TED Case Studies No. 
250, American University. Available from: 
http://www.american.edu/TED/PHILSUG.HTM. 
 
López, R. and G. I. Galinato. 2005. “Trade Policies, Economic Growth, and 
the Direct Causes of Deforestation.” Land Economics 81(2): 145-169. 
Sri Lanka  Tobacco, banana, coconut, mango  C. Bogahawatte. 2003. “Forestry Policy, Non-Timber Forest Products and 
The Rural Economy In The Wet Zone in Sri Lanka.” Economy and 
Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) Research Report. 
Available from: http://ideas.repec.org/p/eep/report/rr1999122.html. 
Thailand  Cassava  P. Macek and K. Chareonying. 1997.  “Thailand's Logging Ban.” TED Case 
Studies No. 69, American University. Available from: 
http://www.american.edu/TED/THAILOG.HTM. 
Venezuela, RB  Banana, coffee, maize, tobacco, cassava, 
sugar cane, citrus fruit 
Allan, J. D.,  A. J. Brenner, J. Erazo, L. Fernandez, A. S. Flecker, D. L. 
Karwan, Samuel Segnini, D. C. Taphorn. 2002. “Land Use in Watersheds of 





Note: Agricultural crops encroaching on forest land refer to crops identified in studies that are planted along shifting agricultural 
frontiers converted from forest land.    37
Appendix 2. Definition and sources of variables used in the study 
Variable name  Definition  Source/s 
Crop, area harvested (ha)  Area harvested in hectares  Author’s calculation using 
data from FAOSTAT – 
Production.
a  
GDP per capita (constant 2000 $)  Gross domestic product 




Crop price index  Calculation is based on the 









t q t p
t q t p
P
c c
c n c  
where P is the change in price 
level, pc,t represents the 
prevailing price of crop c in 
period t, qc,t is the quantity 
of crop c sold in period t,  t0 
is the base period (year 
2000), and tn is the period 
for which the index is 
computed. 
Author’s calculation using 
data from FAOSTAT – 
Production (Crops) database 
and FAOSTAT - Production 
(PriceSTAT) database.
a  
Foreign direct investment  As percentage of GDP.  World Development 
Indicators
b  
Government political stability 
index 
Assesses the government’s 
ability to implement its 
programs and to stay in 
office. 
The PRS Group, Inc.
c  
Corruption control index  An indicator of corruption 
within the political system, 
characterized by financial 
corruption and insidious  
corruption. 
The PRS Group, Inc.
c  
Trade openness  See source.  López et al. (2002) 





Price level of investment  Calculated as Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) over 
Investment divided by the 
exchange rate times 100. 
Penn World Tables
d 
a Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2009. FAOSTAT – 
Production (Crops) and Prices (PriceSTAT) databases. Available from: http://faostat.fao.org/. 
b World Bank. 2009. World Development Indicators. Washington, DC. 
c The PRS Group, Inc. 2009. International Country Risk Guide. Available from: 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx. 
d Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices (CIC). 2006. Penn 
World Tables 6.3. Available from: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt63/pwt63_form.php. 